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PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, COPYRIGHTS,
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
I.

OVERVIEW

During the period covered by this survey, the Tenth Circuit considered
four intellectual property cases involving patents and unfair competition.
The court did not consider cases or issues involving trademarks and copyrights.
A.

Black, Sivalls & Bryson, Inc. v. Keystone Steel Fabrication, Inc.

Initially, in Black, S'valls & Bryson, Inc. v. Keystone Steel Fabr'cation,Inc. ,'
the court addressed claims based on patent infringement and unfair competition. The case involved a device designed to heat industrial fluids uniformly. Plaintiff, Black, Sivalls & Bryson, Inc., commenced the action in the
United States District Court for the District of Oklahoma following the departure of a former employee (head of its heater sales group) who began
immediately to underbid plaintiff in the industrial fluid heater market.
The district court ruled for the defendants on the infringement issue
and granted defendants' motion for a directed verdict on the unfair competition issue. Issues regarding unfair competition were tried before a jury
whereas patent validity and infringement issues were considered by the
court. The plaintiff appealed to the Tenth Circuit arguing: (1) the trial
court erred in not permitting a jury trial on the patent validity and infringement issues; (2) the trial court's finding on the infringement issue was erroneous; and (3) there was sufficient evidence to warrant jury consideration of
claimed trade secrets; therefore, the directed verdict was improper.
Judge McKay's opinion held that the trial court acted properly in trying an infringement issue without a jury where the plaintiff specifically
2
waived in open court its right to a jury trial on this issue. The trial court's
finding on the infringement issue was also upheld by the Tenth Circuit be1. 584 F.2d 946 (10th Cir. 1978).
2. Id. at 949. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide:
When trial by jury has been demanded . . . the action shall be designated upon the
docket as a jury action. The trial of all issues so demanded shall be by jury, unless (1)
the parties or their attorneys of record, . . . by an oral stipulation made in open court
and entered in the record, consent to trial by the court sitting without a jury ....
FED. R. Civ. P. 39(a). Both the trial court and the Tenth Circuit found that the parties orally
stipulated to have the infringement issue, because of its technicality, tried before the court.
The Tenth Circuit did find that the plaintiff reserved its right to a jury trial on the patent
validity issue. However, there was no error on the part of the trial court in refusing a jury trial
on the validity issue because in deciding the infringement issue against the plaintiff, the court
treated the claimed patent as though it were valid even though not formally ruling on the
validity issue. In doing so the court said, "[w]here the court properly finds no infringement, it
would be improper to rule on the validity of the patent. Under such circumstances '[tlo hold a
patent valid if it is not infringed is to decide a hypothetical case.' " 584 F.2d at 950 (citation
omitted).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 57:2

cause the record 3 established that the finding was not "clearly erroneous." '4
In so holding, the court quoted with approval from an earlier opinion:
" 'The question of infringement is one of fact and, upon review, the trial
court's findings thereon will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous
...
. Therefore, our power of review is limited to determining whether,
under correct legal standards, the findings of [noninfringement] are supported by the record.'

"5

Because the jury had deadlocked on the unfair competition issues, the
trial court granted defendants' motion for a directed verdict. The Tenth
Circuit noted that the standard for reviewing the propriety of a directed
verdict is:
whether there is a genuine issue of material fact to be resolved by
the trier of the fact . . . [viewing] the evidence in the light most

favorable to the party against whom the motion for the directed
verdict was addressed and. . . [giving] such party the benefit of all
inferences which the evidence fairly supports,
even though contrary
6
inferences could reasonably be drawn.
The court stated that before the plaintiff could prevail on its claim of unfair
competition, it must show the existence of a trade secret; that the defendants
acquired the trade secret through a confidential relationship;
and that the
7
trade secret was used without authority from the plaintiff.

The court found that several of plaintiffis claimed trade secrets could be
discovered through examination of its patent, its heaters, or information
which had been published. However, the court did hold that the identity
and application of a certain outside heat transfer coefficient and the pricing
information for estimating the man-hours and materials necessary to build a
heater and useful to calculate a bid price were potential trade secrets warranting jury consideration for resolution of the claim of unfair competition.8
3. The record revealed that there were substantial design differences between defendants'
heaters and those of the plaintiff. 584 F.2d at 950.
4. Id.
5. 584 F.2d at 950 (quoting McCullough Tool Co. v. Wells Surveys, Inc., 343 F.2d 381,
401 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denzed, 383 U.S. 933 (1966)).
"Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be
given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." FED. R.
Civ. P. 52(a). To no type of case is this portion of rule 52(a) more appropriately applicable than
to patent cases where the evidence is primarily the testimony of experts. Graver Tank & Mfg.
Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 336 U.S. 271, 274 (1949), aj'don rehearing, 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
6. 584 F.2d at 951 (citations omitted).
7. Id. A trade secret is:
a formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one's business and which gives him an opportunity to gain an economic advantage over competitors who do not know or use it. A trade secret must have a substantial element of
secrecy. While it need not be patentable it must contain elements which are unique
and, not generally known or used in the trade.
Id (citation omitted). Semalso Kodekey Electronics, Inc. v. Mechanex Corp., 486 F.2d 449, 455
(10th Cir. 1973).
8. Id at 951-53. The court found that a jury could reasonably infer that the outside heat
transfer coefficient was useful to the defendants as a starting point for quick and confident
development of a competitive heater. The court also stated that a jury could infer that the
defendants could not have successfully bid on a job without a prototype but for the verified
starting point here established. It was further noted that because of defendant's previous employment with plaintiff and an absence of evidence showing an independent source for the
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Because these matters were not submitted to a jury, the lower court's decithe case was remanded
sion on the unfair competition issue was reversed and
9
for consideration of the two claimed trade secrets.
B.

Deere & Co. v. Hesston Corp.
In Deere &Co. v. Hesston Corp.,"o the Tenth Circuit considered an appeal

from a declaratory judgment action where the plaintiff, Deere & Co., sought
to have defendant's patents on a hay wagon and loader declared invalid.
After plaintiff designed and manufactured a hay wagon in competition with
that sold by the defendant, the plaintiff was notified that defendant considered its patents infringed. Plaintiff commenced an action in the United
States District Court for the District of Utah arguing that defendant's patents were: (1) invalid and therefore not infringed; (2) obtained through
fraud on the Patent Office; and (3) invalid because of the sale of a prototype
of the machine. The defendant denied plaintiffs allegations and counterclaimed alleging infringement.
The trial court found all defendant's patents to be invalid because they
were obvious1I and known to the public 12 longer than one year before the
date of the patent application. 13 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district
4
court's decision.'
Regarding fraud on the Patent Office, Judge Doyle recognized the "but
for" standard, ie., fraud is present if the Patent Office would have rejected 15a
patent application but for a material nondisclosure or misrepresentation.
The Tenth Circuit upheld the trial judge's findings that the Patent Office
would not have rejected defendant's application even though the defendant
failed to disclose the prior art contained in an earlier machine and that there
was not willful, intentional, wrongful, or reckless conduct in the failure to
disclose. 16

The Tenth Circuit approved of the trial court's reliance upon Graham v.
coefficient, a jury could determine that the defendants' discovery of plaintiff's trade secret was
unlawful. Id at 952.
The court stated that the ability to predict a competitor's bid could give a distinct advantage to the one possessing that information. It was found that a jury could reasonably infer that
the defendants' immediate success in underbidding plaintiff was due in part to defendants' use
of plaintiff's pricing information. Id
9. Id at 953.
10. 593 F.2d 956 (10th Cir. 1979).
11. Nonobviousness is a standard of patentability imposed by one section of the Patent
Act:
A patent may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the subject matter
sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole
would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having
ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.
35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976).
12. A person is entitled to a patent unless "the invention was patented or described in a
printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or sale in this country, more
Id at
than one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States .

§ 102(b).
13.
14.
15.
16.

456 F. Supp. 520 (D. Utah 1977), affd, 593 F.2d 956 (10th Cir. 1979).
593 F.2d at 963.
Id at 960.
Id
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John Deere Co. 17 for application of the nonobviousness standard of patentability. "Obviousness under § 103, it was said in John Deere, is to be determined in the light of the prior art by studying the differences between the
prior art and the claims at issue and by resolving the level of ordinary skill in
the pertinent art."1 8 The court also noted with approval the trial court's
careful scrutiny of obviousness in connection with a combination of patent
claims, 19 and affirmed its holding that the defendant's patents did not
achieve a synergistic result that would be nonobvious to a person reasonably
20
skilled in the art.
Finally, Judge Doyle ruled that the trial court did not err in refusing to
grant plaintiff its request for attorney's fees. 2 ' The lower court's finding that
this case was not extraordinary and therefore did not warrant the granting of
attorney's fees was upheld.
C.

Sidewinder Marine, Inc. v. Starbuck Kustom Boats & Products, Inc.

In Sidewinder Marine, Inc. v. Starbuck Kustom Boats & Products, Inc. ,22 the
Tenth Circuit considered an appeal from an action for infringement of a
design patent for the ornamental design of a boat. 23 Initially, the action was
brought by Sidewinder Marine, Inc. in the United States District Court for
the District of Colorado which held that the patent was invalid, thereby
mooting the question of infringement. 24 This holding was based on grounds
26
25
that the design was obvious in light of the prior art and was not original.
Plaintiff appealed the decision of invalidity arguing: (1) the district court
failed to give its design patent the proper presumption of validity and defendant failed to overcome that presumption;2 7 (2) the district court erred in
applying the "ordinary designer" standard rather than the "ordinary intelli17. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).

18. 593 F.2d at 961. The court also recognized the Supreme Court's secondary tests of
nonobviousness: commerical success, long felt but unsolved need in the industry, and failure of
competitors to develop the device sought to be patented. Id The court did note that commercial success without invention does not by itself suffice to establish nonobviousness. Id.at 962.
19. Id The court noted from Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273 (1976) that in order to
establish patent validity for a combination of old elements, there must be a synergistic effect,
ie.,
an effect greater than the sum of the several initial effects taken separately. 593 F.2d at 962.
Moreover, a "patent is supposed to add to the sum of useful knowledge,. . . and patents are not
to be sustained when their effect is to subtract from former resources freely available to skilled
artisans." M. at 963.
20. Id Both the district court and Tenth Circuit based their decisions on the fact that the
defendant's patents combined old elements which continued to function as they previously did
with no new and different function. Id
21. Id
22. 597 F.2d 201 (10th Cir. 1979).
23. The design was that of the "Super Sidewinder" speed boat which gained immediate
popularity and success in the late 1960's and early 1970's.
24. 418 F. Supp. 224 (D. Colo. 1976), aj'd, 597 F.2d 201 (10th Cir. 1979).
25. Id at 227-28. The nonobviousness standard is imposed at 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976). See
note 11 supra.
26. 418 F. Supp. at 231. An additional requirement for design patents is that they be new
and original. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1976).
27. In support of this argument, the plaintiff cited 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1976) which provides
in part that a patent once issued "shall be presumed valid," and that "[t]he burden of establishing invalidity . . .shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity."

1980]

PA TENTS AND TRADEMARKS

gent man" standard in assessing the obviousness issue; 28 and (3) the district
court's findings on obviousness were improper.
At the outset, Judge Holloway noted that the burden on an alleged
infringer to rebut the presumption of patent validity is great, requiring the
alleged infringer to introduce "clear and convincing" evidence in this regard. 29 It was noted, though, that this presumption is significantly weakened where the patent has been issued without consideration of prior art not
submitted to the Patent Office. 30 The court held that this presumption was
significantly weakened in light of boat designs and analogous car designs
submitted by the defendant at trial which the Patent Office had not considered when the patent was issued. 3 ' The court cautioned, however, that overcoming the presumption of validity does not, by itself, invalidate the
32
patent.
In connection with the presumption issue, the plaintiff argued that a
prior determination of the patent's validity33 is strong evidence of its validity
in this case. Judge Holloway responded by noting cases giving a prior adjudication of patent validity "comity," "great weight," and "respectful consideration,"' 4 but held that such adjudication does not, absent estoppel,
supplant the court's duty to try cases according to the law and present
facts-particularly where, as here, relevant prior art was not considered by
35
the court in the prior adjudication.
Relevant to the district court's findings on obviousness, the Tenth Circuit cited Graham v. John Deere Co. 36 and Deere & Co. v. Hesston Corp.37 for the
appropriate standard.3 8 In connection with this standard, the Tenth Circuit
held that
explicit findings in the exact terms of the Graham criteria are [not]
required, "[s]o long as it is clear that the court has grappled with
the problem presented," and its findings are "sufficient to provide
[us] with a clear understanding of the. . . court's reasons so as to
28. This issue is given detailed consideration in the text accompanying notes 62-76 infra.
29. 597 F.2d at 205 (citing Moore v. Schultz, 491 F.2d 294, 298 (10th Cir. 1974)).
30. 597 F.2d at 206.
31. Id at 206, 207.
32. Id at 206 n.6.
33. In Sidewinder Marine, Inc. v. Burns, 176 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 499 (C.D. Cal. 1972), the
court upheld the validity of the Super Sidewinder patent, found it to be infringed, and awarded
plaintiff compensatory and punitive damages totalling $35,150 as well as reasonable attorneys'
fees.
It is significant to note that an initial determination of a patent's validity does not bar
nonparticipants in that determination from subsequently asserting the patent's invalidity.
Boutell v. Volk, 449 F.2d 673 (10th Cir. 1971). An obverse proposition--that an initial determination of a patent's invalidity may be used on the basis of collateral estoppel by one facing a
charge of infringement in a subsequent action-has been established by the Supreme Court.
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
34. Those cases affording a "high presumption of validity" to a patent the subject of a
prior favorable validity adjudication were distinguished on the basis that the same court had
previously upheld the patent in question. 597 F.2d at 206-07 n.7.
35. Id at 206-07. The Burns court did not have before it some of the significant analogous
automobile designs here submitted by the defendant.
36. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
37. 593 F.2d 956 (10th Cir. 1979).
38. 597 F.2d at 209. The standard'is noted in the text accompanying note 18 supra
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' 39

As with findings of infringement, a trial court's findings on obviousness are
not to be set aside unless they are "clearly erroneous." ' 40 Based on the district court's record and other factors presented by the defendant, e.g., similar
boat designs and analogous car designs, Judge Holloway ruled that the trial
court's findings on obviousness were not "clearly erroneous. '4 ' Accordingly,
the district court's decision was affirmed by the Tenth Circuit.
D. True Temper Corp. v. CF&I Steel Corp.
Finally, in True Temper Corp. v. CF&I Steel Corp.,42 the Tenth Circuit
addressed an appeal from actions for infringement of a patent covering a
one-piece rail anchor used by railroads and a patent covering an automatic
press used to manufacture the rail anchor. In its unreported opinion, the
United States District Court for the District of Colorado held that both
plaintiff's (True Temper) patents were invalid on the bases of full anticipation in the prior art 4 3 and obviousness to a person of ordinary skill in the
art.4 4 The district court further held that True Temper's inequitable conduct before the Patent Office in seeking both patents barred their enforcement against the alleged infringer and that even if the patents had been
deemed valid and enforceable, CF&I's devices did not infringe on True
Temper's claims under the patents. Defendant's request for attorney's fees
was denied by the district court, and both parties appealed to the Tenth
Circuit. The plaintiff sought reversal of all holdings adverse to it, and the
defendant sought reversal of the denial of attorney's fees.
At the outset, Judge Holloway noted that the exercise of fraud, inequitable conduct, or bad faith in seeking a patent before the Patent Office may
result in the patent's subsequent unenforceability. 45 After discussing the
case law pertaining to fraud on the Patent Office, the Tenth Circuit noted
that "intentional fraud on the Patent Office is not the only ground for withholding enforcement of patents" and adopted the view of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in Norton v.Curltss4 6 that patents should not be
enforced where " 'misrepresentations [are] made in an atmosphere of gross
39. 597 F.2d at 209 (quoting Price v. Lake Sales Supply R.M., Inc., 510 F.2d 388, 391
(10th Cir. 1974).

40. 597 F.2d at 209. See also note 5 supra.
41. 597 F.2d at 209-10.
42. 601 F.2d 495 (10th Cir. 1979).
43. The novelty requirement is imposed by section 102 of the Patent Act: "A person shall
be entitled to a patent unless- (a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or
patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention
thereof by the applicant for the patent ...." 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1976).
44. Id at § 103. See also note 11 supra.
45. 601 F.2d at 501. The trial court's holding of fraud on the Patent Office was based on
findings that the plaintiff failed to disclose material facts to the Patent Office and submitted
evidence which was inaccurate, incomplete, and misleading. In affidavits submitted by the
plaintiff to the Patent Office after initial rejection of the rail anchor patent, it was not mentioned that an incomplete William3 rail anchor, prior art in the industry, was used in comparison tests to establish the superiority of plaintiff's anchor. Moreover, the affidavits did not
disclose that the partial Williams anchor was machined whereas plaintiff's complete anchor was
forged. Id at 501.
46. 433 F.2d 779 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
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negligence as to their truth,' . . . [citations omitted] or where there is reckless conduct in representations to the Patent Office. . . . ",47 The court also
particularly noted the cases where test results and similar data were submitted to the Patent Office, demanding a higher standard of fraud on the Patent Office than mere avoidance of intentional fraud. 48 Because the test
results submitted in plaintiffs affidavits to the Patent Office contained material omissions and were seriously misleading, 49 the Tenth Circuit upheld the
district court's finding of fraud on the Patent Office and affirmed the rail
anchor patent's unenforceability. 50 As such, the court did not consider the
district court's findings on patent invalidity and noninfringement as to the
rail anchor patent.
In consideration of the patent covering the apparatus and process for
producing rail anchors, the Tenth Circuit confined its review to the district
court's rulings on obviousness and fraud on the Patent Office. In determining whether the district court's ruling on obviousness was "clearly erroneous," Judge Holloway applied the standard of Graham v.John Deere Co. ,5 also
followed in Sidewinder Martne, Inc. v. Starbuck Kustom Boats & Products, Inc. ,52
53
and recognized the statutory presumption of validity for an issued patent.
The court noted that the presumption of validity was seriously weakened by
defendant's introduction at trial of prior art more pertinent to plaintiff's
process but not cited in the application to the Patent Office. 54 Ultimately,

court's findings on obviousness were
Judge Holloway ruled that the district
55
amply supported by the record.
The court also stated that for a combination of known elements to be
patentable, the result must be synergistic. 56 Since the plaintiffs process took
47. 601 F.2d at 501. A comparison of this standard with that articulated by Judge Doyle
in Deere & Co. v. Hesston Corp. is provided in the text accompanying notes 77-86 info.
48. Id at 501 (citing Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 794 (C.C.P.A. 1970); Monsanto Co.
v. Rohm & Hass Co., 456 F.2d 592, 597 n.10 (3d Cir. 1972); Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. DavisEdwards Pharmacal Corp., 443 F.2d 867, 881 (2d Cir. 1971), cerl. denied, 412 U.S. 929 (1973)).
49. 601 F.2d at 500-05. In particular, the court referred to testimony by the defendant's
expert that he had conducted his own tests of the Williams design as compared with the plaintiff's design and arrived at significantly different results than were reported to the Patent Office
by the plaintiff. Id at 502-03.
In addition, plaintiff's argument that the information omitted from its affidavits was not
material to the examination of the patent application was rejected by the Tenth Circuit. Because the affidavits were intended to cure the Patent Office's initial rejection of the application,
the information contained therein or a lack of it was deemed by the court to be material. Id at
503.
50. Id at 505.
51. 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
52. 597 F.2d 201 (10th Cir. 1979).
53. 601 F.2d at 505.
54. Id at 505. The newly introduced prior art consisted of (1) plaintiff's own fully automatic system for manufacturing an earlier anchor, (2) its hand fed system for early production
of the new anchor, and (3) an automated press developed for the forging of crawler track links
and other such items. Id
55. Id In connection therewith, the Tenth Circuit noted that "explicit findings in the exact terms of Graham are not required, '[s]o long as it is clear that the court has grappled with the
problems presented.'" Id at 506 n. II (citing Sidewinder Marine, Inc. v. Starbuck Kustom
Boats & Prod., Inc., 597 F.2d 201, 209 (10th Cir. 1979)).
56. 601 F.2d at 506. This holding is consistent with the court's previous holding in Deere
& Co. v. Hesston Corp., 593 F.2d 956, 962 (10th Cir. 1979), although the court here did not cite
Deere & Co.
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essentially the same steps in producing rail anchors as did prior art, mere
automation of the process was held to be obvious, ie., conceivable to a
57
worker of ordinary skill in that industry.
As to fraud on the Patent Office, the district court found that plaintiff's
failure to disclose its methods of manufacturing early rail anchors as prior
art was a serious omission which may have affected the Patent Office's decision on the patentability of the device. 58 The Tenth Circuit held that such
findings would support unenforceability of the patent 59 and affirmed the
60
lower court's unenforceability ruling based on fraud on the Patent Office.
Finally, because the district court failed to consider fraud on the Patent
Office in connection with the denial of attorney's fees to the defendant, this
judgment was vacated and the issue was remanded to the district court for
reconsideration. 6 1

_

II.

SIGNIFICANT MATTERS

The cases considered in this survey contained three significant points of
interest to the patent bar which merit additional and separate consideration.
Of importance is the Tenth Circuit's adoption of the "ordinary designer"
standard with respect to obviousness in design patents. Next, in separate but
similar cases, the Tenth Circuit applied two different standards in connection with fraud on the Patent Office. Finally, the Tenth Circuit's remand of
a case for the consideration of attorney's fees is significant.
A.

Obviousness in Design Patents and the "Ordinagy Designer" Standard

In SidewinderMarine, Inc., the Tenth Circuit rejected plaintiff's argument
that the "ordinary intelligent man" standard rather than the "ordinary designer" standard should be applied in assessing the obviousness of a design
patent. 6 2 There is a division among circuits as to which is the appropriate
standard, and this case represents the Tenth Circuit's initial consideration of
63
the issue and it's adoption of the more stringent approach.
To establish the patentability of designs, the Patent Act expressly re57. 601 F.2d at 506.
58. Id at 507.
59. Id (citing Admiral Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 296 F.2d 708, 716 (10th Cir. 1961)).
60. 601 F.2d at 508.
61. Id at 510. Further consideration is given to the attorney's fees issue in the test accompanying notes 87-104 zifra.
62. 597 F.2d at 207-09; The trial court, acknowledging a division among circuits as to
which standard is relevent as well as an absence ofjudicial guidance by either the Tenth Circuit
or Supreme Court, applied both standards to find plaintiff's design patent obvious. 418 F.
Supp. at 229-31. The trial court did, however, prefer the "ordinary designer" standard. Id at
228-29.
Because the Tenth Circuit could not conclude that plaintiff's design would be obvious
under both the "ordinary designer" and "ordinary intelligent man" standards, the court sought
to determine the applicable standard and proceed on that basis. 597 F.2d at 207.
63. The Tenth Circuit here takes the approach followed by the Second, Third, Sixth,
Eighth, and District of Columbia Circuits in connection with the standard of obviousness applicable to the design patent area. See Clark Equip. Co. v. Keller, 570 F.2d 778, 799 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 825 (1978); Schnadig Corp. v. Gaines Mfg. Co., 494 F.2d 383, 389 (6th Cir.
1974); Fields v. Schuyler, 472 F.2d 1304, 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 987 (1973);
Hadco Products, Inc. v. Walter Kidde & Co., 462 F.2d 1265, 1272 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
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quires satisfaction of the standards for patentability of inventions 6 4 including, iter a/ia, nonobviousness. 65 The Tenth Circuit noted that in dealing
with utility patents, other courts have interpreted Section 103's "person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains" 66 to focus

not on some hypothetical ordinary intelligent person but rather on one "reasonably skilled" in the art. 6 7 Thus, the court held that the proper standard
for determining the nonobviousness of designs is the "ordinary designer"
standard. 68 The court felt that this standard (1) more closely parallels Section 103's statutory mandate, and (2) provides a more objective reference
69
point concerning obviousness than the ordinary intelligent man standard.
The ordinary intelligent man standard was first followed by the Ninth
Circuit in Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. ,70 a significant
design patent decision. There the court held that knowledge of an ordinary
intelligent man is the standard by which to measure the obviousness of a
design. 71 The Ninth Circuit followed the lead of the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals in In re Laverne which held that under Section 103, it is only
necessary to determine obviousness to the ordinary intelligent man (because
the test is visual) to ascertain appearance of the design as a whole, requiring
no special skill. 72 However, the Tenth Circuit has chosen what appears to be
the majority view-the ordinary designer standard for determining the obviousness of design patents.
The ordinary designer standard is more stringent than the ordinary intelligent man standard in that the former requires a greater degree for invention to establish nonobviousncss. 73 For this reason, the district court in
applying the ordinary designer standard permitted previously existing automobile designs to be considered as developments in an analogous field of
which a boat designer could reasonably be expected to be aware. 74 The
Tenth Circuit accepted the district court's consideration of analogous car
designs 75 and ultimately affirmed its finding that plaintiffs boat design was
obvious.
B.

76

The Standardfor Ascertaining Fraud on the Patent Oftce

In suits for patent infringement, unenforceability is a statutory defense
1023 (1972); G.B. Lewis Co. v. Gould Prod., Inc., 436 F.2d 1176, 1178 (2d Cir. 1971). See also 2
A. WALKER, PATENTS, § 161 at 757 (1964).

64. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1976).
65. See note 11 supra.
66. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976).
67. 597 F.2d at 207-08.

68. 1d at 208.
69. Id
70. 444 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1970).
71. Id at 299.
72. 456 F.2d 1003, 1006 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
73. 418 F. Supp. at 230.
74. Id at 229-30. The district court felt that under the ordinary intelligent man standard,
only prior boat designs would be relevant since "there is no reason to expect a layman to make
subtle comparisons between boat decks and the upper body designs of automobiles." Id at 229.
75. 597 F.2d at 207.
76. Id at 209-10.
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under the Patent Act.77 The exercise of fraud, inequitable conduct, or bad
faith in seeking a patent before the Patent Office may result in the patent's
unenforceability. 78 Any individual who is substantially involved in the
preparation or prosecution of a patent application has a duty of candor and
good faith toward the Patent Office requiring disclosure of information
79
which is material to the examination of the application.
Recall from Deere & Co. that the Tenth Circuit adopted the "but for"
test to determine if fraud on the Patent Office had been committed where
certain prior art had not been disclosed in a patent application.80 Under
this standard, fraud exists if the Patent Office would have rejected a patent
application but for a material nondisclosure. The principle was derived
from Norton v. Curtiss,8 a significant case considering fraud on the Patent
Office. In Deere & Co., the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that failure to disclose the prior art contained in two earlier haystacking
machines did not constitute fraud since the Patent Office would not have
82
rejected the application but for the nondisclosure.
In another patent infringement case, True Temper, the Tenth Circuit applied a somewhat different standard to affirm a lower court's decision that
fraud on the Patent Office had been committed where nondisclosures and
misrepresentations had been made in comparison test data involving the
83
new invention and prior art, and in identifying and describing prior art.
The court noted that intentional fraud on the Patent Office was not the only
ground by which to render a patent unenforceable and held that patents
could be deemed unenforceable where misrepresentations were8 4made recklessly or in an atmosphere of gross negligence as to their truth.
However, in comparing application of the "but for" and more exacting
"recklessness or gross negligence" standards for ascertaining fraud on the
Patent Office, the Deere & Co. and True Temper decisions can be reconciled.
First, the higher recklessness or gross negligence standard was applied to a
situation where test results and similar data were involved in the material
misrepresentations and omissions to the Patent Office. The Tenth Circuit
particularly noted that such cases require a higher standard than avoidance
of intentional fraud.8 5 Second, True Temper appeared to apply the "but for"
standard in connection with the plaintiffs failure to disclose its former methods of producing rail anchors as relevant prior art in its patent application
for a process to automatically produce rail anchors. The court noted and
77. 35 U.S.C. § 282(l) (1976).
78. See, e.g., Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779

(C.C.P.A. 1970); Admiral Corp. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 296 F.2d 708 (10th Cir. 1961).
79. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1978). Information is material where there is a substantial liklihood that a reasonable examiner would consider it important in deciding whether to issue a
patent. Id.
80. 593 F.2d at 960.
81. 433 F.2d 779, 793 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
82. 593 F.2d at 960.
83. True Temper Corp. v. CF&I Steel Corp., 601 F.2d 495, 500-05, 507-08 (10th Cir.
1979).
84. Id at 502.
85. Id
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affirmed the district court's finding that had the Patent Office been aware of
plaintiff's systems for producing earlier rail anchors, it may well have de86
cided differently on the patentability of plaintiffs new process.
Thus, it appears that where misrepresentation or nondisclosure involve
presentation of the prior art in a patent application, the "but for" standard
is appropriate for determining whether fraud on the Patent Office has occurred. However, if test and similar data comparing the new-and prior art
are involved in the nondisclosure, a higher standard than avoidance of intentional fraud, "the recklessness or gross negligence" test, will be applied by
the Tenth Circuit.
C.

Attorney's Fees and Costs in Patent Infringement Cases

In True Temper, the lower court denied a motion for costs and reasonable
attorney's fees submitted by the defendant, CF&I Steel Corp., on the ground
87
that the case presented was not so exceptional as to warrant such recovery.
88
The trial court further ruled that each party was to bear its own costs.
CF&I appealed this decision to the Tenth Circuit arguing, interaha, that the
lower court applied the wrong legal standard in exercising its discretion
under the Patent Act to grant attorney's fees.8 9
At the outset, the Tenth Circuit noted cases where a plaintiffs motives
or tactics in bringing or maintaining his action may render the case exceptional, justifying an award of attorney's fees to the prevailing defendant, e.g.,
where the plaintiff was aware of the obvious invalidity of his patent when
the action was commenced,90 or where the action once brought was vexatious or unduly protracted. 9 1 The court accepted the district court's finding
that True Temper brought the action in good faith but held that there was
an additional factor to be considered in ruling upon the attorney's fees issue.9 2 The Tenth Circuit requires that the patentee's conduct in seeking the
patent be carefully reviewed, as fraud on the Patent Office is sufficient to
make a case exceptional, as is conduct in excess of simple negligence but
93
short of intentional fraud.
Such conduct is a serious breach of the patentee's duty to the Patent Office. The party who succeeds in invalidating the unlawful
86. Id at 507-08.
87. Id at 497.
88. Id
89. "The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing
party." 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1976). It is clear, however, that the trial court has considerable discretion in deciding whether to grant attorney's fees. See, e.g., Maurice A. Garbell, Inc. v. Boeing
Co., 546 F.2d 297, 300 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 955 (1977); Iron Ore Co. of Can. v.
Dow Chemical Co., 500 F.2d 189, 195 (10th Cir. 1974).

90. Tidewater Patent Dev. Co. v. Kitchen, 371 F.2d 1004, 1013 (4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 821 (1967).
91. Uarco Inc. v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 440 F.2d 580, 586 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 873 (1971). Seealso Parker v. Motorola, Inc., 524 F.2d 518, 535 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,

425 U.S. 975 (1976); Seismograph Serv. Corp. v. Offshore Raydist, Inc., 263 F.2d 5, 24, 28 (5th
Cir. 1958).

92. 601 F.2d at 508.
93. Id at 509 (citing Monolith Portland Midwest Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp.,
407 F.2d 288, 294 (9th Cir. 1969)).
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patent performs a valuable public service. It is appropriate under
such circumstances to reward the prevailing party by giving him
attorney's fees for his efforts, and it is equally appropriate to penalize in the same measure
the patentee who obtained the patent by
94
his wrongdoing.
Because the lower court, in its application of Section 285, failed to consider the additional factor of True Temper's misconduct in originally obtaining the patents, its judgment was vacated by the Tenth Circuit, and the
issue of attorney's fees was remanded. 95 In deciding to remand this issue, the
Tenth Circuit felt that the matter was one the trial court should initially
96
determine and refused to make its own findings.
The Tenth Circuit noted that it had previously recognized this additional factor for applying Section 285 of the Patent Act. 97 Thus, this principle is not new for the Tenth Circuit. However, the decision is significant for
comparison purposes in light of an earlier holding by the court in Halliburton
Co. v. Dow Chemical Co. that nondisclosure of prior art is insufficient to sustain an award of attorney's fees unless the nondisclosure is done in bad faith
98
with intent to deceive.
lalhburton involved a plaintiff who was awarded a declaratory judgment that the defendant's patent was invalid for obviousness. The lower
court had also awarded plaintiff attorney's fees, grounded on a finding of
fraud on the Patent Office for nondisclosure of prior art, but the Tenth Circuit reversed the fee award. The Tenth Circuit further held that the award
of attorney's fees is compensatory rather than punitive and noted that the
party seeking the fees also commenced the action without being forced to do
so.99 True Temper is distinguishable as the defendant, rather than the plaintiff, sought attorney's fees. However, the True Temper court did note that the
Halliburtonstandard would be relevant on remand to the district court's consideration of the issue as to True Temper's process patent where only nondisclosure of prior art was involved.'o There was no indication whether the
Halhburton standard would be applicable to True Temper's misconduct in
the prosecution of its rail anchor patent involving material omissions and
misrepresentations of comparison test data.' 0 ' The awarding of attorney's
fees would seem to be justified in this instance as the Tenth Circuit looks
with disfavor upon omissions or misrepresentations in a patent application of
test data submitted to show the superiority of the applicant's device com94. 601 F.2d at 509 (quoting Monolith Portland Midwest Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum &
Chemical Corp., 407 F.2d 288, 294 (9th Cir. 1969)).
95. 601 F.2d at 509-10.
96. Id at 509 (citing United States v. Ariz. Canning Co., 212 F.2d 532, 535 (10th Cir.
1954)).
97. 601 F.2d at 509 (citing Halliburton Co. v. Dow Chemical Co., 514 F.2d 377, 381-82
(10th Cir. 1975); Q-Panel Co. v. Newfield, 482 F.2d 210, 211 (10th Cir. 1973)). In Q-Panel Co.,
the Tenth Circuit affirmed a lower court's denial of attorney's fees in a patent infringement case
where the circumstances leading to granting of the patent were "unusual" but did not constitute
unfair, reckless, or fraudulent conduct so as to make the case exceptional under the Patent Act.
98. 514 F.2d 377, 381 (10th Cir. 1975).
99. Id at 382.
100. 601 F.2d at 509 n.15.
101. Id at 509.
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pared with prior art. However, this tangential issue remains unanswered.10

2

As to costs, the district court had directed that each party bear its own
costs, and CF&I appealed arguing that it was error and an abuse of discretion to not impose costs upon True Temper. Based on the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, the Tenth Circuit noted a presumption that the prevailing
party should recover costs unless there is some reason for penalizing him if
costs are to be denied. 10 3 Because the district court failed to adequately
explain its reasons for the denial of costs, the judgment was vacated, and the
issue was remanded to reconsider and express a ruling on costs. 104
Randallj. Feuersteh

102. The attorney's fees issue did not receive further district court consideration as the remanded case was settled out of court.
103. 601 F.2d at 509 (citing Popeil Brothers, Inc. v. Schick Electric, Inc., 516 F.2d 772, 775
(7th Cir. 1975)).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that "costs shall be allowed as of course to
the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs.
... FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d).
104. 601 F.2d at 510.

